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I. INTRODUCTION

In 1984, the state legislature enacted
the California Endangered Species Act
(CESA).' In recognition of the state's
unique natural diversity and the runaway population growth which threatens
to destroy it, CESA's primary purpose is
to afford protection to animal and plant
species whose populations and/or habitats have so seriously declined that their
very survival is called into question.
Under CESA since 1984, the state Fish
and Game Commission (FGC)-usually
upon the recommendation of the
Department of Fish and Game (DFG)has studied, recognized, and "listed" as
threatened or endangered 71 animals
and 140 plants.' This listing entitles
those species to certain protections from
governmental and private incursions.
In an era when excessive governmental regulation lacking traditional
justification flourishes, CESA's purpose
is particularly defensible. It seeks to prevent the ultimate irreparable harm: the
forever-irreversible extinction of a
California species. It is not absolute; it
bends-perhaps overly so-to the needs
of a 30,000,000-citizen state. At best, it
is a modest attempt to balance the developer's pocketbook with the conservationist's zeal; it simply requires-in theory-the state (and those who must
secure permission from the state to build
or develop) to step back, think, and perhaps to seek alternatives to minimize
adverse effects on species in danger of
extinction.
But CESA doesn't work. In its latest
report on the status of species as endangered or threatened, DFG acknowledged
that 71% of the listed plant and animal
species-that is, those which have
already passed through the lengthy and
arduous listing process- are further
declining 3 DFG also acknowledged 650
unlisted species which, in the words of
DFG, "could presently meet the criteria
for listing" but have not yet been formally addressed by FGC and DFG.4
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These species lack the prospect of timely palliatives to slow their possible
descent to extinction.
Despite the wide-ranging effects of
CESA, very little has been written about
it. No appellate court decisions have
interpreted the Act,5 and no legal articles
on either the Act or its implications have
been published. This article examines
CESA and its demonstrated deficiencies: it is too cumbersome and restrictive for developers; it is too difficult and
expensive for environmentalists; the
state lacks the money and the will to
resource it properly; the agencies
responsible for enforcing it lack authority, resources, and commitment, and are
hampered by structural and political
impediments; and it is too lengthy for
endangered plant and animal species,
which are literally dying out while waiting to be listed.
If it seeks to make good on the
promise of CESA, the legislature should
take a hard look at the language of the
statute, the regulatory process it creates,
the agencies responsible for implementing it, and its overall commitment to
conserving and preserving California's
fish, wildlife, and plants for future generations.
II. THE ACT
In enacting CESA, the legislature
declared its intent that animals and
plants threatened with extinction
deserve and will receive protection by
the state. The legislature's concerns are
expressed within the Act itself:
The Legislature hereby finds and
declares all of the following:
(a) Certain species of fish,
wildlife, and plants have been rendered extinct as a consequence of
man's activities, untempered by adequate concern and conservation.
(b) Other species of fish,
wildlife, and plants are in danger of,
or are threatened with, extinction
because their habitats are threatened
with destruction, adverse modification, or severe curtailment, or
because of overexploitation, disease,
predation, or other factors.
(c) These species of fish,
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wildlife, and plants are of ecological,
educational, historical, recreational,
aesthetic, economic, and scientific
value to the people of this state, and
the conservation, protection, and
enhancement of these species and6
their habitat is of statewide concern.
To carry out this intent, CESA sets
forth a variety of mechanisms: (1) a listing procedure for the identification of
species at risk; (2) a range of protections
for listed species from harm caused by
state-sponsored, funded, or approved
projects;' and (3) a "consultation"
requirement, whereby state agencies
wishing to carry out projects which may
adversely impact a listed species are
required to consult with DFG to determine reasonable alternatives which will
alleviate that impact, or mitigation and
species enhancement measures if there
is no reasonable alternative to the project as proposed. These mechanisms are
described in detail below.
A. The Listing Procedure
1. Listing in the Normal Course.
Article 2 of the Act specifies the process
for listing a species.8 The law allows
FGC to grant one of two designations
-threatened or endangered-to a particular species. As used in the statute, an
"endangered" species is defined as:
a native species or subspecies of
bird, mammal, fish, amphibian, reptile, or plant which is in serious danger of becoming extinct throughout
all, or a significant portion, of its
range due to one or more causes,
including loss of habitat, change in
habitat, overexploitation, predation,
competition, or disease.9
A "threatened" species is defined as:
a native species or subspecies of a
bird, mammal, fish, amphibian, reptile, or plant that, although not
presently threatened with extinction,
is likely to become an endangered
species in the foreseeable future in
the absence of the special protection
and management efforts required by
this chapter.'"
CESA requires FGC to establish a
list of both threatened and endangered
species. It also authorizes the Commission
to add or remove species from these lists

<M
if the best scientific information available to the Commission warrants such
action." The statute allows interested
parties to petition the Commission to
place a species on either list. Further, in
the absence of a third party petition,
DFG may propose the addition or deletion of a species.' 2
To be preliminarily accepted by
FGC, a petition for listing must include
sufficient scientific information to show
that the proposed action "may be warranted."' 3 The scientific data required to
be contained in a listing petition
includes information on the species'
population trend; range, distribution,
abundance, and life history of the
species; factors affecting the ability of
the population to survive and reproduce;
the degree and immediacy of the threat;
and the availability and sources of this
scientific information." Because listing
a species as either threatened or endangered is both costly and potentially disruptive to state and private interests,'"
the legislature has imposed a heavy burden on petitioners to demonstrate that a
proposed listing is warranted.
If a submitted petition contains all
the specified scientific information, the
Commission has ten days in which to
refer it to DFG for evaluation. 6 The
Department then has ninety days in
which to evaluate the petition and make
a recommendation as to whether the
species deserves protective status, based
on the information contained in the petition.'7 Following the ninety-day evaluation period, FGC must schedule the petition and DFG's recommendation for
consideration at its next available public
meeting."
If DFG makes a positive recommendation and the Commission agrees, the
petitioned species is then considered a
"candidate"."' This does not mean that
the species has been listed; rather, "candidate" status is an interim step indicating that the Department is evaluating the
status of this species to determine
whether it warrants the permanent protections afforded through listing.2'
Following FGC's preliminary acceptance of the petition and designation of
the species as a "candidate", DFG has
twelve months in which to review the
status of the species and make a recommendation to FGC as to permanent listing. DFG must provide a written report
to the Commission, "based upon
the best scientific information available...which indicates whether the petitioned action is warranted, which
includes a preliminary identification of
the habitat that may be essential to the
continued existence of the species, and
which recommends management activi-
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ties and other recommendations for
recovery of the species." 2'
Following receipt of DFG's report
and recommendation, FGC must schedule the petition for "final consideration"
at its next available meeting. 2 At that
meeting, the Commission must decide
whether the petitioned action is warranted. It should be emphasized that the
Commission's final decision on the petition is wholly discretionary. The statute
sets forth no specific criteria which, if
present, would require FGC to list a
species. The statute only requires DFG
to recommend and FGC to adopt "criteria for determining if a species is endangered or threatened."23 However, nothing
in either the statute or the applicable
regulations 4 requires FGC to list a
species under any circumstances.
If FGC finds that the proposed
species deserves protection, it must then
publish a notice of proposed rulemaking
in the California Regulatory Notice
Register, open the proposal to public
comments for a minimum 45-day period, schedule an optional public hearing
on the proposal, formally adopt the proposed listing at a public meeting, compile the administrative rulemaking
record for review by the Office of
Administrative Law (OAL), submit it to
OAL, and await OAL's approval after a
thirty-day review period.25 If the
Commission denies the petition or fails
to act, the petitioner may seek judicial
review through a petition for writ of
mandate pursuant to Code of Civil
Procedure section 1094.5.26
2. Emergency Listing. Aside from the
normal petitioning procedure, CESA's
Article 2 also allows FGC to immediately list a species on an urgency basis if it
finds "that there is any emergency posing a significant threat to the continued27
existence" of a particular species.
Designed primarily as a safety valve,
this authority permits emergency listing
where exigent circumstances so justify.
If a given species is endangered to the
point of extinction and the normal rulemaking process will take too long, the
Commission has the power to immediately list the species." The listing is temporary in nature, and must be followed
by rulemaking in order to confer permanent protection.
3. Periodic Review and Reporting.
Article 2 also requires DFG to conduct a
periodic review of all listed species to
ensure they warrant continued protection. Each species is to be reviewed
every five years to determine whether
the conditions that resulted in the original listing are still present. This review
shall include "identification of the habitat that may be essential to the continued

existence of the species and the department's recommendations for management activities and other recommendations for recovery of the species."29
DFG is required to submit reports on
its five-year review of each listed
species to FGC.3 0 If a five-year report
includes a recommendation to add or
remove a species from the list, the report
is to be treated as a petition pursuant to
section 2072.7 of the Code, thus triggering the one-year DFG formal evaluation
period.'
By January 30 of each year, DFG is
also required to submit to FGC, the legislature, the Governor, and the public an
annual report summarizing the status of
all state-listed endangered,
threatened,
2
and candidate species.
B. Protections Afforded
Listed Species
1. Prohibitionon Taking. CESA's
Article 3 sets forth several specific protections for listed species. Under the
Act, no person may import into
California, export from California, or
take, possess, purchase, or sell within
California any listed species (with specified exceptions). 3 This prohibition
applies to any endangered, threatened,
and-under certain conditions- candidate species."
The Act also provides some protection for the "habitat essential to the continued existence" of listed species. State
agencies are prohibited from approving
projects which would "result in the
destruction or adverse modification of a
listed species' habitat."' 3
2. Consultations. The heart of
CESA's protections lies in its "consultation" requirement. Once a species is listed by FGC, a state "lead agency" 6 (that
is, the state agency which is carrying out
a project, or which is primarily responsible for approving a project) must consult
with DFG, in accordance with the guidelines developed by the Department,3 "to
ensure that any action authorized, funded, or carried out by that state lead agency is not likely to jeopardize the continued existence of any endangered or
threatened species."'8 When a lead agency consults with DFG on a proposed
project, the Department must "issue a
written finding based on its determination of whether a proposed project
would jeopardize the continued existence of any endangered species or
threatened species or result in the
destruction or adverse modification of
habitat essential to the continued existence of the species."' 9
CESA includes an unequivocal
statement: "[a] state lead agency shall
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not approve a project which would likely result in the extinction of any endangered species or threatened species."'
However, short of that circumstance,
state agencies may undertake projects
which do result in harm to listed
species, under specified conditions.
If, after consultation, DFG finds that
a lead agency's proposed project would
jeopardize a listed species, "the department shall determine and specify to the
state lead agency reasonable and prudent alternatives consistent with conserving the species which would prevent
jeopardy to the continued existence of
the species or the destruction or adverse
modification of the habitat essential to
the continued existence of the species."'
The lead agency must incorporate
these "reasonable and prudent alternatives" into the specifications for its proposed project," unless "specific economic, social, or other conditions make
infeasible the alternatives" prescribed
by DFG. 41 In that case, the lead agency
may proceed with its project if both of
the following conditions are met: (1) the
lead agency requires "reasonable mitigation and enhancement measures as are
necessary and appropriate to minimize
the adverse impacts of the project" upon
the endangered or threatened species or
its habitat; and (2) the lead agency finds
both that the "benefits of the project as
proposed clearly outweigh the benefits
of the project were it to be carried out
with the reasonable and prudent alternatives," and that it has not made "an irreversible or irretrievable commitment" of
resources to the project after commencing consultation with DFG, which "has
the effect of foreclosing the opportunity
for formulating and implementing reasonable and prudent alternatives consistent with conserving the species....44
Thus, while consultations with DFG
are required, the lead agency may
approve projects over Departmental
objections, so long as there is no threat
of extinction to a listed species, reasonable mitigation measures are included in
the project, and the importance of the
state activity as proposed outweighs the
project as compromised through incorporation of alternatives aimed at preserving the species.
In spite of this limitation, the consultation requirement is critical because it
attempts to institutionalize species and
habitat preservation as a statewide goal
with consistent application by a single
responsible agency (DFG). Procedurally,
it is crucial because it puts the burden of
notice to and consultation with DFG on
the state lead agency seeking to complete the project. Despite the importance
of the consultation requirement to the

The California Regulatory Law Reporter

purpose of CESA, it will sunset on
January 1, 1994,
unless the legislature
4
acts to extend it. 1
In 1989, 15 state lead agencies initiated 56 formal project consultations
with DFG." Of these consultations, no
challenges to Department findings were
made, and no consultations finalized in
1989 resulted in jeopardy findings. 7
C. Recovery of Listed Species
The purpose of CESA is to ensure
the survival of California's native plant
and wildlife populations despite soaring
population growth and unprecedented
development throughout the state. While
the Act offers protection to listed
species, its ultimate goal is to ensure
recovery of these groups to the point of
viability. 8 The protections afforded by
CESA and other more drastic restoration
efforts have successfully halted or
reversed dramatic declines in some
California listed species.
One example is the California
Bighorn Sheep. While the species
remains listed by the state as threatened,
careful management efforts have led to a
substantial increase in its numbers.
When the Bighorn Sheep was listed, it
was estimated that its population consisted of 195 animals. Following the
imposition of protection from poaching,
reduced competition from domestic livestock, water development, and successful reintroduction programs, the Bighorn
population increased to 327.1 Although
this species will never be as abundant as
it once was, careful management has
enabled the Bighorn to increase and
securely occupy portions of its former
range.'
Another notable example is the
California Condor. The Condor once
thrived within the state. However, due to
killings by ranchers, pesticide use, and
lead poisoning, the species declined to
the edge of extinction. To prevent the
complete loss of this species, federal
and state officials were forced to remove
these birds from the wild in 1987 and
place them in captive breeding programs. Now, all known condors are in
captivity in the Los Angeles and San
Diego zoos. Through these programs,
the birds have reproduced; the current
population stands at 32 condors.' The
return of the California Condor to the
wild will not occur until at least 1992.52
DFG's 1989 Annual Report on the
status of listed species states that several
other endangered species, such as the
bald eagle, peregrine falcon, and
California brown pelican, are "on the
road to recovery as their numbers have
increased in response to active manage-
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ment programs and controls on pollutants." 3
However, DFG/FGC critics chasten
the two agencies for what they call "biological brinkmanship": in spite of
overwhelming scientific evidence,
DFG/FGC often refuse to act until a
species is at the absolute verge of
extinction.' As in the case of the condor, once the species is finally listed,
DFG and FGC are then required to take
(or recommend to lead agencies) far
more costly and drastic measures than
would have been required had the agencies acted earlier. These last-minute
efforts are also less effective, because
the species has been allowed to dwindle
to the point where the gene pool has
become biologically depleted.
Further, these isolated successes are
overshadowed by the very disturbing
"big picture" presented by DFG itself in
its 1989 report: "71% of the listed
plant and animal species are declining."-" The reason for this decline, says
DFG, is the "destruction and degradation of endangered species habitat
through a variety of direct and indirect
human impacts." 6 Further, "[m]any of
our endangered species survive as very
small, fragmented populations in habitat
degraded by human activities. Under
such conditions, there is no certainty
that they will survive for long."57
Finally, DFG notes that 34 animal
species and subspecies have already
become extinct in California. 8 These
facts, as admitted by DFG, indicate that
a critical review of CESA, DFG, FGC,
and California's commitment to preservation of its natural flora and fauna is
long overdue.

III. THE EFFECTIVENESS OF
CESA AND THE AGENCIES
RESPONSIBLE FOR
ENFORCING IT
DFG's own finding that 71% of listed species are declining- that is,
species already recognized by the state
as endangered or threatened and receiving the statute's substantive protections- is indicative of serious problems
within the statute itself and within DFG
and FGC, the entities responsible for
implementing and enforcing CESA. A
close look at the statute reveals that it is
fraught with loopholes and weaknesses;
in fact, the listing procedure created by
the statute-rather than preventing the
irreparable harm resulting from the
complete extinction of a species-probably contributes to serious and costly
decline through its sheer length. A criti-
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cal appraisal of the structure and performance of DFG and FGC-several of
which have been performed by other
government agencies, task forces, and
public interest groups in the past few
years-reveals that major changes are
needed if the legislature is truly serious
about protection of California's endangered species.
A. CESA Is Weak and
Filled With Loopholes
1. Delay. One of the most accepted
and traditional justifications for the creation of regulatory mechanisms is the
prevention of external costs, particularly
irreparable harm, which would otherwise occur in the absence of regulation. 9
With its goal of preventing permanent
extinction of native California species,
CESA has a highly defensible theoretical justification.
However, the particular regulatory
scheme created in CESA to accomplish
its goal is self-defeating. The normalcourse listing procedure and rulemaking
proceeding together take a minimum of
644 days 6 -or one year and nine
months after a serious threat to the
species is already documentable and
documented. This figure assumes that
FGC meets promptly after receipt of
DFG information (which is not always
the case), that DFG is expeditious in
preparing its rulemaking filings and
record (which is not always the case),
and that the Office of Administrative
Law does not find fault with the rulemaking record.6 ' This degree of built-in,
required delay is inexcusable, especially
where time is of the essence and
irreparable harm is imminent. FGC's
emergency listing procedure has the
potential to ameliorate this weakness,
62
but it has never been used by FGC.
2. FGC Is Not Required To Act. As
noted above, nothing in CESA requires
the Commission to list a species under
any circumstances. FGC's decisionmaking authority at all points in the
listing process is wholly discretionary.
Although the Department is required to
rely on and present to the Commission
"the best scientific information available,' 63 the statute sets forth no criteria
or circumstances under which the
Commission is required to list a species,
and no requirement that it rely on that
scientific information.
Further, although CESA requires
FGC to adopt "criteria for determining
if a species is endangered or threatened," the standards FGC has adopted
for itself are none too specific. Under
the California Code of Regulations, the
Commission "shall" list a species "if the
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Commission determines that its continued existence is in serious danger or it is
threatened by any one or any combination of the following factors: (1) present
or threatened modification or destruction of its habitat; (2) overexploitation;
(3) predation; (4) competition; (5) disease; or (6) other natural occurrences or
human related activities. 5 None of these
vague terms are further defined or quantified in any meaningful way. Moreover,
in adopting this regulation, FGC has
merely restated (almost verbatim) statutory language, 66 and has arguably adopted no listing criteria as directed by the
legislature in the five years CESA has
existed.
During the latter half of 1989, FGC
rejected five petitions for listing, in the
face of strong evidence presented by
state biologists and other experts that the
species were seriously threatened and
that they would continue to deteriorate
in the absence of government intervention. "The Commission rejected the five
species in the absence of any testimony
challenging the biological merits of listing and with no public discussion on the
scant written arguments from scientists
hired by the opposition."67
This grant of unbridled discretion
and absence of mandatory criteria effectively insulates FGC listing decisions
from judicial review. A listing decision
is reviewable by a court under the "substantial evidence" test;6 that is, the court
must uphold FGC's listing decision if its
findings are supported by substantial
evidence in light of the whole record.'
This limited judicial review allows no
weighing of the evidence by the court;
the court is not permitted to substitute
its judgment for that of FGC. If a listing
decision is ever challenged in court, the
court will be reviewing the validity of
FGC's decision without the benefit of
any concrete, defined, or quantitative
standards to guide the decisionmaking
of FGC. In such cases, courts usually
defer to and rarely overturn agencies.
3. CESA Allows Harm to Listed
Species. Two key criticisms of this law
are that it does not apply directly to anyone but the state (e.g., CESA does not
require local governments to consult
with DFG when they wish to engage in
a project which will impact a listed
species), 6 and that it then permits the
state to harm a listed species." Many
environmentalists would prefer stronger
language which insulates listed species
from harm. However, as one of the primary authors of this statute noted,
"Given the climate in the legislature in
1984, we were very lucky to get this bill
out of committee, let alone get it passed
and signed by the Governor."

Because no appellate court cases
have tested this statute," 3 the precise
extent of the protections for listed
species conferred by CESA remains
unclear. No actions have been taken to
force agencies to halt projects that may
threaten listed species,' and the Act
contains no sanctions for state agencies
which approve projects which fail to
comply with its provisions.
4. CESA Grants DFG No Real
Authority in the Consultation Process.
As described above, state lead agencies
wishing to engage in projects which
may impact the continued existence of a
listed species must consult with DFG,
and DFG must make a written jeopardy
finding with respect to the species."
While the Department may describe and
insist that the lead agency incorporate
reasonable and prudent alternatives
which would prevent jeopardy to the
listed species, that lead agency may
ignore the Department's suggestions so
long as it incorporates mitigation measures and it finds both that the project as
proposed is of significant public benefit
and that it has not acted in bad faith by
infusing money into the project after
DFG consultation has commenced. 6 In
describing DFG's chances of forcing the
use of alternatives, the top Department
official in charge of implementing
CESA stated, "If push came to shove,
and we insisted, we would probably
lose.""
5. FGC Is Free to Engage in Ex
Parte Contacts and Ignores Conflict of
Interest Prohibitions.The five-member
Fish and Game Commission is the state
policymaking board responsible for
deciding, at a public and open meeting,
whether to designate a species as a "candidate", and (one year later) whether to
list a species as endangered or threatened, thus affording it the permanent
protections of CESA. These listing decisions may be expensive ones for many
interested parties, yet nothing in CESA
or the Fish and Game Code prevents
FGC commissioners from engaging in
off-the-record, ex parte contacts outside
the public hearing at which the decision
is made.
Further, FGC members appear to be
unaware of or unwilling to follow state
law prohibiting participation in an official vote which constitutes a conflict of
interest."6 The Sacramento Bee discovered that FGC Commissioner Benjamin
F. Biaggini-former chair, chief
executive officer, and director of
Southern Pacific Transportation
Company-recently voted against a proposed listing which would have resulted
in restrictions on Southern Pacific's use
of a railroad right of way. He also voted

The California Regulatory Law Reporter

Vol. 10, Nos. 2 & 3 (Spring/Summer 1990)

FEATURE ARTICLE
to reject the proposed listing of the flattailed horned lizard; its territory
includes land set aside for geothermal
exploration and production by Southern
California Edison and Unocal Inc.
According to the Bee, Biaggini owns
more than $100,000 of stock in each of
those companies. 9
B. The Agencies Responsible for
Implementing CESA
The discussion above points out
serious weaknesses in the drafting and
structure of CESA itself. However, even
the best-drafted statute is only as good
as the agency implementing it. The
Commission on California State
Government Organization and Economy
("Little Hoover Commission" or
"LHC") recently completed a yearlong
study of the structure and performance
of both DFG and FGC. 0 According to
the Little Hoover Commission, if the
legislature is committed to the preservation of California's unique flora and
fauna, it must not only strengthen
CESA; it must dramatically revamp the
structure and resources of the agencies
responsible for implementing it.
1.The Little Hoover Commission's
Evaluation of DFG and FGC. LHC's
report first focuses on the historical purpose of the two agencies, the gradual
shift in legislative policy and public
opinion toward environmental consciousness and conservation, and the
failure of the two agencies to adjust
their orientations to that mandated
focus.
In 1951, the legislature created DFG
as part of the state Resources Agency;
its primary (and admittedly vast)
responsibility is the management of
California's fish and wildlife resources.'
In creating DFG, the legislature vested
in one department the duty and authority
to pursue four main objectives: (1)to
maintain all species of wildlife; (2) to
provide for diversified recreation; (3) to
provide an economic contribution to
California's economy; and (4) to promote scientific and educational use
through management of fish and
wildlife." DFG, which maintains five
regional offices throughout the state, is
administered by a Director, who is
appointed by the Governor and confirmed by the Senate for an indeterminate term.83
Pursuant to Article IV, section 20 of
the California Constitution, the Fish and
Game Commission is the policymaking
board of the Department. It is composed
of five part-time commissioners, all
appointed by the Governor, who serve
for six-year terms.' Other than receiv-
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ing Senate confirmation, commissioners
need not possess any specific qualifications in order to be appointed. FGC's
general charge is to formulate policies
governing the conduct of DFG. FGC is
required to hold at least ten public meetings per year -8 and is subject to the
Bagley-Keene Open Meetings Act" and
the Administrative Procedure Act;8'
thus, it must adopt regulations and conduct its decisionmaking at public, open
meetings after notice to the public and
an opportunity for comment.
Whereas the "original charter" of
FGC was to "provide for reasonably
structured taking of California's fish and
game," 8 FGC is now responsible for
determining hunting and fishing season
dates and regulations, setting license
fees for fish and game taking, listing
endangered species, granting permits to
conduct otherwise prohibited activities
(e.g., scientific taking of protected
species for research), and acquiring~and
maintaining lands needed for habitat
conservation." This list is by no means
comprehensive; it merely serves to illustrate the variety of sometimes-conflicting activities that receive Commission
attention.
As noted, the Commission and the
Department were created to administer a
broad legislative mandate. These farreaching responsibilities have become
increasingly difficult due to California's
astounding population growth and the
housing and development needed to
accommodate that growth. In addition,
over the years the legislature has
required FGC and DFG to incorporate
and implement an entirely new set
of priorities. These directives-embodied in CESA and the California
Environmental Quality Act (CEQA)
-now require DFG and FGC to effectively guard and conserve California's
wildlife populations and their habitat,
rather than simply maintaining them for
their structured taking by hunters and
fishers. Under CEQA, "the maintenance
of a quality environment for the people
of this state now and in the future is a
matter of statewide concern," and every
citizen, corporation, and public agency
"has a responsibility to contribute to the
preservation and enhancement of the
environment."' This mandate expressly
includes preventing the elimination of
fish and wildlife species, insuring that
fish and wildlife populations do not drop
below self-perpetuating levels, and preserving for future generations representations of all plant and animal communities and examples of the major periods
of California history.9' Under CEQA,
DFG is a "trustee agency": "a state
agency having jurisdiction by law over
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natural resources ... which are held in
trust for the people of the State of
California."'
The expanding role of DFG/FGC in
protecting California's environment now
includes many responsibilities that were
never contemplated when either were
created. While the Little Hoover
Commission's report focused on the performance of both entities in administering all of their statutory responsibilities,
some of the Commission's findings are
particularly relevant to the ability of
DFG/FGC to adequately implement
CESA:
*There are no clear and publicly
understood criteriafor selection and
appointment of Fish and Game
Commissioners. "The Fish and Game
Commission's mandate and related
activities have grown far beyond the
time when the good intentions and honest opinions of five sportspersons could
be relied on to mold the state's natural
resources policies."9
*FGC, as presently structured, cannot adequately exercise its statutory
authority over the Department. The
Hoover report discussed several facets
of this criticism: (1)the Department
Director is selected by the Governor (as
are the FGC Commissioners), instead of
serving at the pleasure of FGC; (2) the
current DFG Director has stated that his
primary responsibility is to the
Governor, and not to "FGC; (3) FGC is
necessarily reliant on DFG for research
and scientific information, due to FGC's
minimal staff and resources; (4) FGC is
not an effective, viable policymaker for
DFG, because the Commission's constitutionally authorized structure places it
outside the executive branch, and FGC's
ability to exercise administrative control
over DFG's implementation of policy is
undercut; and (5) there is little or no
"unity of perspective, unity of operation," or even formal relationship among
DFG, FGC, and the Resources Agency
within which both reside. 94
*FGC has difficulty in meeting its
mandate because of external pressures.
The Little Hoover Commission noted
the "wildly conflicting pressures" of trying to allow hunters and fishers their traditional access to fish and game, while
simultaneously attempting to maintain
the natural diversity and populations of
California's wildlife. 9' The Hoover
report noted that this problem is especially serious in cases where scientific
evidence is not available or is inconclusive; in these and other cases, FGC has
often bowed to political pressures from
executive branch appointees and/or to
its own apparent
internal bias in favor of
9
sportspeople. 6
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*Both DFG and FGC are underfunded; DFG is not capable of appropriately allocating resources. FGC,
which is staffed by an Executive
Secretary, an Assistant Executive
Secretary, and five clerical support positions, was allocated only $429,000 in
1989-90. It is thus required to rely heavily on DFG staff resources for technical
and support research and assistance. 97
In 1988-89, DFG's six offices functioned with a staff of 1,568 full-time
positions and a total budget of $118 million.9" In that same year, DFG's overall
budget was funded from several revenue
sources, including $12.5 million from
the California Environmental License
Plate Fund, $67.9 million from the Fish
and Game Preservation Fund (which
includes all monies from the sale of
licenses, permits, fees, and/or penalties),
$15.7 million from the federal government, and $8.9 million from the state's
general fund. CESA implementation is
funded through DFG's Natural Heritage
Account, which received $11.2 million
in 1988-89. This account was decreased
to $10.3 million in 1989-90, and the
Governor's proposed 1990-91 budget
would further decrease the funding for
this account to $8.9 million," despite the
increasing size of the state's threatened
and endangered populations."
Both DFG and its critics agree that
these numbers are insufficient to finance
the Department's mandated responsibilities. 1'' Further, "both critics and the
DFG suggest the present system of categorical funding of specific departmental
activities is inconsistent with changing
and accelerating needs."'' 2 This legislative restriction on DFG's use of particular funds for particular programs, found
in Fish and Game Code section 711,
requires, inter alia, that the costs of all
nongame fish and wildlife programs
(including CESA) be funded only
through appropriations from the state
general fund and sources other than the
Fish and Game Preservation Fund. In
other words, the largest source of DFG
revenue-"consumptive use" fees of
various types (fishing/hunting permits,
licenses, fees)- may only be used to
support "consumptive-oriented" programs."
This restriction has been identified
by a special Resources Agency task
force as the source of "growing tension
between availability of funding for
game activities (supported by the Fish
and Game Preservation Fund) and for
non-game activities (supported largely
by the General Fund)."'0 5 According to
the task force,
[o]n the one hand, the kinds of
expenditures that can be made from

the Fish and Game Preservation
Fund are statutorily restricted, with
constituent groups actively monitoring revenues derived from fees and
licenses charged to them. On the
other hand, nongame workload has
been growing at a time when the
availability of General Fund revenues has been limited.'"
This "alleged funding imbalance for
nongame activities'"" is exacerbated by
DFG's historical lack of a consistent and
comprehensive cost allocation methodology and its inability to account for
expenditures."
Further, the Little Hoover Commission found that DFG is not capable of
appropriately allocating resources.
The Department cannot provide the
required level of monitoring,
enforcement and timely expertise
and research consistent with the
requirements of its mandate.
Increasingly, policy and implementation decisions, especially with
respect to staff support to the FGC,
must be made on the basis of incomplete or dated information. This situation is largely determined by the
previously noted lack of sufficient
resources, but also owes itself to an
unfortunate configuration of accelerated (and in some case not fully
informed) public expectations, critical wildlife and habitat needs and a
late-developing science."
2. Petition Backlog Within FGC and
DFG. In addition to the serious problems noted by the Little Hoover
Commission, we note that a large and
growing backlog of species is awaiting
action by DFG and FGC-further
corroborating the inadequacy of
DFG/FGC's staff and resources.
California currently lists 280 plants and
animals as endangered, threatened, or
rare." ' According to DFG's last count,
the number of additional species that
could presently meet the criteria for listing totals over 650."' These plants and
animals are awaiting Department action
recognizing their dwindling population
numbers. The number in this group
increases constantly and, without action,
is expected to top 1,000 by the year
1994.2

In 1988, with over 600 species whose
population levels warranted attention,
only 33 were reviewed by the
Commission. Of those 33, two were listed and two were rejected. The final 29
(four animals and 25 plants) remained as
candidates for listing, to be reviewed in
1989 following their one-year review
period."3 In 1989, FGC listed the four
animal species and 22 of the plants."'
DFG recommended the listing of two

additional animals (the flat-tailed homed
lizard"5 and the Suisun song sparrow);
however, FGC rejected DFG's recommendations." 6
When confronted with these rather
pathetic statistics in light of the huge
number of species awaiting listing and
the irreparable harm at stake, the
Department defended itself by stating
that the lengthy petition process is clearly spelled out in the enabling statute.
The Department argued that simply listing a species without a thorough review
would circumvent the very statute that
environmentalists seek to enforce. DFG
also pointed out that without a complete
study of a petitioned species, some may
be listed that should not be. "If you list
things that do not belong there, you call
into question the legitimacy of other
species that clearly need to be on the
list."' 7
The Department's limited nongame
heritage account, which includes funds
for implementing CESA, is clearly an
inhibiting factor in diminishing the huge
backlog of species which, according to
DFG, probably deserve to be listed now.
A 1987 study of California's natural
diversity prepared at the request of the
Senate Committee on Natural Resources
and Wildlife concluded: "[i]ncreased
scientific and administrative effort is
needed to accelerate the scientific evaluation of species' statuses and to process
the legal documentation 8required to list
species under [CESA].""
3. DFG's Commitment to Enforcing
CESA Is Minimal. Although we previously criticized CESA for its failure to
vest DFG with any real authority in
CESA's consultation process, DFG
recently refused to enforce the consultation requirement en toto, and in the process abdicated its responsibility as the
guardian of California's endangered
species and its jurisdiction over natural
resources "held in trust' for
9 the people of
the State of California." 1
During the past year, the California
Department of Food and Agriculture
(CDFA) has waged an expensive and
not entirely successful war against the
Mediterranean fruit fly (Medfly) and the
Mexican fruit fly (Mexfly). Since
August 1989, CDFA's discovery of fertile flies in southern California has
resulted in the imposition of "pest eradication procedures," including broadscale aerial malathion spraying.' 20
Although several cities have attempted
to halt or postpone the spraying through
petitions for writ of mandate, none have
been successful to date.
One such city-the San Diego suburb of El Cajon-became the target of
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CDFA and its insecticide-laden helicopters through a May 10, 1990 decision of the CDFA Director, as a result of
the discovery of three Mexflies. In its
petition challenging the decision, El
Cajon alleged CDFA's violation of
CESA as one cause of action. 2 The
City argued that the second largest population in the United States of the Least
Bell's Vireo-listed as endangered by
FGC since 1980-inhabits an area just
two miles downwind of the malathion
spray zone. El Cajon produced declarations and testimony of several wellknown biologists and entomologists
stating that the birds were nesting at the
time of 'the aerial spraying; that the
birds' primary food source is insects;
and that broad-area aerial malathion
spraying would result in an almost complete loss of the insect population in the
area sprayed. These experts urged a fullscale evaluation by.DFG of the impact
of the reduced food supply on the adult
birds, foraging for food for the
nestlings, the nestlings themselves, and
on the birds' ability to build up the
nutritional reserves needed for a successful migration after the nesting season is completed.
El Cajon also alleged that CDFA had
failed to comply with CESA's consultation requirement, thus depriving DFG of
the opportunity to engage in the kind of
evaluation deemed necessary by the
experts. The City based its allegation
upon statements by several relevant
DFG biologists confirming CDFA's failure to engage in either formal or informal consultation.'2 2 At most, CDFA had
made one telephone call to DFG "to find
out if there are any endangered species
in the El Cajon area;"'23 CDFA was told
to check DFG's Natural Diversity Data
Bank. Further, that phone call did not
take place until May 17 or 18-well
after the announced decision of the
CDFA Director to commence aerial
spraying in El Cajon. Two biologists in
DFG's regional office covering El Cajon
stated that the phone call and the information exchanged in it constituted neither a formal nor an informal consultation pursuant to CESA.' 4
In spite of their acknowledgement
that CDFA had failed to engage in anything remotely resembling a bona fide
consultation, the DFG biologists refused
to assist El Cajon. When asked whether
DFG would participate as co-petitioner
in the mandamus action-to assert
DFG's own statutory right to be consulted-DFG's Endangered Species Act
Coordinator refused, stating that his
superiors would never allow such an
action.'25 When asked to provide declarations in support of El Cajon's asser-
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tions, several DFG biologists also
refused.'26
At a three-day trial on the City's
motion for permanent injunction, DFG
biologist Krishan Lal-much to the
City's chagrin-apparently turned that
one phone call into a "consultation"
under CESA. In deciding against El
Cajon and permitting the aerial spraying
to continue, Municipal Court Judge J.
Michael Bollman, sitting as a Superior
Court judge, ruled that CDFA did in fact
"consult" with DFG pursuant to
CESA 27
This ruling, which is pending
appeal,'28 devastates CESA's consultation requirement. The consultation
requirement of CESA's Article 4 clearly
contemplates the exchange of documents and the details of the proposed
project, an analysis and determination
by DFG based on the "best available
scientific information," and a "written
finding [by DFG] based on its determination of whether a proposed project
would jeopardize the continued existence of any endangered species.... ' ' 12
CDFA's eleventh-hour attempt, now validated by a lower court, does not
approach true compliance with the letter
and spirit of the statute, and the whole
incident is a clear demonstration of
DFG's indifference, weakness, and lacks.
of commitment to its statutory responsibility.
4. Politics in the Listing Process. In
an ideal world, FGC's listing decisions
should depend solely on the scientific
evidence presented with a petition.
Unfortunately, CESA requires no such
thing, and real-world problems and politics enter into the decisionmaking process. "When politics and biology mix,
biology often loses."'30
The most recent example of the
intrusion of politics into what should be
a scientific decision is the case of
California's official state reptile, the
desert tortoise.' 3 Since 1984, conservationist groups such as Defenders of
Wildlife and the Desert Tortoise Council
have been attempting to secure both
state and federal listing for the species,
due to dramatic declines in its population in the western Mojave Desert.
Biologists estimate that the tortoise population has dropped 90% in the past fifty
years, and between 30%-70% in the last
eight years alone.'32 The tortoise has
been plagued by a series of problems
including habitat destruction, malnutrition due to loss of native plants to cattle
grazing, theft and wanton shooting by
"plinkers" who use the slow-moving
animals for target practice, and constant
attacks by predators such as ravens.'
Moreover, a viral respiratory infection,
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introduced from captured animals
returned to the desert, has affected most
of the remaining wild desert tortoises."
Despite the substantial evidence
indicating that listing was warranted,
several groups-including ranchers,
mining interests, and off-road vehicle
users-actively opposed listing. If the
tortoise were listed, the state would
restrict cattle grazing, prevent mining,
and halt the use of off-road vehicles in
state-controlled, critical tortoise habitat.
Because the tortoise's range includes
much of the western Mojave Desert,
listing could result in significant limitations on desert use. However, precise
restrictions and their cost are not known,
and are not properly a part of the decision to list or not to list a species under
the statutory scheme.
After years of delay and debate, FGC
finally designated the tortoise as a "candidate" species in November 1987. One
year later, FGC unanimously approved
the proposed listing at its section 2075.5
"final consideration" hearing. on
November 10, 1988,' 35 and scheduled a
rulemaking proceeding to amend section
670.5 of its regulations to list the desert
tortoise. 36
While the opposition of these constituencies was expected, the objection
of the federal Bureau of Land
Management (BLM) was not. In a
February 1, 1989 letter to FGC-just
two days before the Commission was
scheduled to vote on proposed rulemaking which would finally list the tortoise,
BLM requested that the state delay listing for two to four years. BLM's stated
reason for this request was that it would
like time to implement protection programs for the tortoise on federally controlled lands before California acts to
protect the species; BLM also noted that
state listing could be perceived as overly
restrictive by sheep 37grazers and off-road
vehicle enthusiasts.
Several groups were amazed at
BLM's action, and urged FGC to ignore
it. BLM's position was especially surprising in light of its own studies, which
confirmed a 50% population decline
during the past six years in the western
Mojave desert.'38 The Desert Tortoise
Council, which originally petitioned for
the listing of the tortoise, argued that the
proposed state listing would only
enhance conservation efforts, and would
in no way affect federal projects because
it would not apply to territory under
BLM's jurisdiction. Conservationists
also argued that to delay listing for two
to four years would probably render any
eventual designation meaningless; the
tortoise would probably become extinct
during that time.
M
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On February 3, 1989, at the meeting
at which FGC was scheduled to vote on
the proposed rulemaking, BLM's own
biologist Kristin Berry stated that the
Commission should ignore the request
of her employer and act immediately to
protect the tortoise. According to Berry,
"The state listing of the desert tortoise is
absolutely essential to maintaining
viable healthy populations, and to stopping severe declines in existing populations."'39 DFG also strongly endorsed
listing the desert tortoise as threatened.
Despite the substantial scientific
information supporting the petition, its
own earlier unanimous vote at the
"final consideration" hearing, and the
Department's strong backing of the listing, the Commission gave in to the
political pressure, refused to adopt the
proposed rulemaking which would have
effectuated listing on February 3, and
put the matter over until its June meeting.'" While the tortoise was eventually
listed by the Commission in June 1989,
its five-year delay (where time is clearly
of the essence) and 3-2 vote (in spite of
overwhelming scientific evidence) left
many environmental groups understandably skeptical of FGC's commitment to
protecting species.'' If California's official state reptile becomes extinct, the
on the
blame may be placed squarely
42
shoulders of BLM and FGC.
IV. NEW DIRECTIONS FOR
SPECIES PROTECTION
IN CALIFORNIA
Since CESA became law, many suggestions have been made to amend it
and/or to enact supplemental legislation
which will offer more meaningful protection to the state's threatened and
endangered populations. Some recommendations focus solely on the procedural side of the listing process; others
seek to balance the membership of the
Fish and Game Commission and clarify
legislative intent regarding its role and
its relationship to the Department; still
others would give selected species protective status by bypassing the statute
altogether. This section will identify and
explain the most recent proposals to
change the way in which threatened
species receive protection within the
state.
A. Improving the Listing Process
In 1989, Senator Dan McCorquodale
-disturbed by FGC's stalling on the
desert tortoise petition-introduced SB
999. In its original form, SB 999 would
have shortened the listing process by

forcing the Commission to combine its
section 2075.5 "final consideration"
hearing with the hearing on proposed
rulemaking required by CESA and the
Administrative Procedure Act. As introduced, SB 999 would also have eliminated the required OAL review of a
favorable listing decision, and made the
listing effective upon the date of FGC's
adoption.' 3 According to the analysis of
the Assembly Committee on Water,
Parks and Wildlife, "this bill would
close the existing loophole by requiring
the Commission to adopt an implementing rule or regulation upon making its
final decision and by preventing the
Commission from using the Office of
Administrative Law procedures to
thwart the listing procedures contained
in existing statutes."'"
Environmental groups saw this bill as
one way of accelerating and removing
politics from the listing process. Citing
their struggle to list the desert tortoise
despite the scientific evidence that clearly favored its listing, conservationists
viewed this legislation as both necessary
and long overdue. 45' Additionally, neither FGC nor DFG opposed the bill.
However, Governor Deukmejian vetoed
it on September 26, 1989. In his veto
message, the Governor objected to
"reduc[ing] the two-hearing process into
one concurrent public hearing," finding
that "these changes
are not in the pub4 6
lic's interest.'
B. Reforming FGC and DFG
At this writing, several bills which
would revamp FGC are pending in
the legislature. Senate Bill 2840
(McCorquodale),
introduced on
March 2, 1990, would transfer all of the
powers and duties of FGC to a newlycreated Fish and Wildlife Commission
(FWC). FWC would be composed of
twelve members who would serve fouryear terms; the Governor, Assembly
Speaker, and Senate Rules Committee
would each appoint four members.
Senator McCorquodale's bill sets forth
qualifications for the members of the
new FWC: specific members would represent various interested constituencies,
including hunting organizations, recreational fishing organizations, environmental organizations, commercial fishers who are California residents, animal
protection organizations, and land trust
organizations. Other FWC members
would include persons with postsecondary degrees in wildlife management,
marine biology, and fisheries biology;
and three public members.
Assembly Constitutional Amendment 51 (Campbell), as amended June

28, would similarly replace the existing
FGC with a Fish and Wildlife
Commission, this one composed of nine
members each serving four-year terms.
The Governor would appoint five of the
members, subject to Senate confirmation; the Senate Rules Committee and
the Assembly Speaker would each
appoint two members. ACA 51 also sets
forth qualifications for membership:
specified members must have experience in wildlife management, marine
biology and fisheries biology; other
members would represent hunters, land
trusts, recreational sportfishers, environmental organizations, and commercial
fishers; finally, one member would be a
public member. Additionally, ACA 51
attempts to ensure geographical representation: the five gubernatorial
appointees must each represent one of
five fish and game districts; and the four
legislative appointments must be split
between northern and southern
California representatives.
A package of bills carried by
Assemblymember Jim Costa takes a different approach altogether. As amended
April 16, Assembly Bill 3160 (Costa)
would transform FGC into a mere advisory committee, and transfer FGC's
existing powers and duties to DFG.
Assembly Bill 3159 (Costa), as introduced February 22, 1990, would rename
DFG as "Department of Fish and
Wildlife" (DFW), and declare that the
Department has been delegated the primary responsibility for the protection
and preservation of the fish, wildlife,
and native plants of California. The bill
also requires all state and local agencies
to give "great weight" to the findings of
DFW regarding the protection, preservation, restoration, and maintenance of
fish, wildlife, and native plants and the
habitat necessary for those purposes.
Finally, Assembly Bill 3158 (Costa)
attempts to increase DFW's revenues by
transferring from FGC to DFW the
authority to set fees for the issuance of
all licenses, tags, certificates, and other
entitlements. Where no fee is set in
statute, DFW would be allowed to set
one. The bill would also authorize DFW
to establish a fee to cover its reasonable
costs for monitoring and enforcing
resources protection policies relating to
state- and local agency-funded or
approved projects.
C. Proposed "Species of Serious
Concern" Category
One attempt to change the state's
system of protecting species has come
from within the Commission. In
February 1989, FGC proposed regulation
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changes that would have made listing
"permissive" rather than "mandatory";
they also would have required DFG to
prepare recovery plans in lieu of the listing of species as threatened or endangered.'47
Following the receipt of outraged
comments from conservationists, the
Commission amended the language of
its proposed regulatory changes. The
amended language would have provided
for the establishment of a list of "species
of serious concern," in addition to the
two existing designations of threatened
and endangered. Further, the amended
language would have required DFG to
prepare recovery plans for all threatened
and endangered species, as well as for
species of serious concern. '
The Commission explained that the
purpose of the proposed rule was to
enable it to identify species which are
not yet threatened or endangered, but
which are of "serious concern" because
of dwindling populations or habitat. The
Commission also noted that it wanted
regulations requiring DFG to prepare
recovery plans, which would help
enhance threatened or endangered
species so they may eventually be taken
off the protective lists.
This regulatory proposal worried
environmental groups. While many conservationists supported the idea of a
"serious concern" category to monitor
declining species, some were fearful
that the Commission would use this new
classification to avoid listing species-a
fear prompted particularly by the language of the regulation as originally
proposed. Also, because CESA provides
protection only for species listed as
threatened or endangered, this new category would offer no substantive protective status.
In part because of the reaction from
environmental groups, the Commission
dropped this proposal in June 1989.' 4 It
is, however, still studying the possibility
of creating this category.
D. Protecting Species
Without Using CESA
Some conservationists are using a
different approach-the initiative process-in seeking increased protection
for species in the state. In 1986, a state
statute which granted protective status
to the mountain lion expired.' 0
Subsequently, FGC approved two
mountain lion hunts, both of which were
struck down by the San Francisco
Superior Court. 5 ' The Mountain Lion
Preservation Foundation recently sponsored an initiative that removes the
mountain lion issue from FGC and DFG
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and reestablishes in statute protections
for California's mountain lions.
Proposition 117, which was successful
on the June 1990 ballot, prohibits trophy
hunting of mountain lions and allocates
$30 million per year for thirty years to
acquire habitat for mountain lions, deer,
and threatened and endangered species.
This proposal is unique in that it is
the first attempt to propose protection
for an individual species through the initiative process. Some DFG representatives are worried that if more are proposed for other species, California could
end up with a crazy-quilt of laws to protect individual groups of wildlife.
Another concern is that this and future
similar initiatives will undermine the
very purpose of CESA.
But perhaps the biggest worry at
DFG regarding this proposal is that the
$30 million fund to protect the mountain
lion and acquire habitat must come from
existing revenue sources; the initiative
makes no provision for new money.
Because no new funds are provided,
DFG fears that existing and vital programs will have to be curtailed. DFG
also argues that, in relation to listed
species, the mountain lion has a healthy
population level; if CESA dollars are
diverted to finance Proposition 117, listed species could suffer as a result of this
initiative.'52
Sharon Negri, a leader in the fight for
this initiative, disputes DFG's concerns.
She states that the initiative would
not have been necessary had the
Commission not insisted on approving a
hunt. Proposition 117 will not weaken
wildlife protection, she notes, but rather
strengthen it by demonstrating to the
legislature and the Governor that the
people of California will not tolerate
needless destruction of wildlife."'
V. CONCLUSION
In its five-year existence, CESA
has-at best-delayed the extinction of
280 California species. If the legislature
truly seeks to prevent the extinction of
the 280 species listed by FGC and
650 others which-according to
DFG-deserve listing now, it must act
expeditiously to overhaul the statute, its
regulatory process, and the agencies
responsible for implementing it.
Strengthening the language of the
statute itself, while a band-aid approach,
is one place to start. A variation on SB
999's theme would require FGC to
immediately adopt an emergency
amendment to its regulations at the time
it approves a species for listing at its
section 2075.5 "final consideration"
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hearing. This step would alleviate some
of the delay in the process while preserving the systematic review of state
agency rulemaking actions by OAL.
At the very least, the legislature
should require FGC to adopt real criteria
for listing species. FGC's existing "criteria" are simply a restatement of the
statutory language, and do not even
attempt to quantify a point at which the
Commission must list. If FGC continues
to balk, the legislature should enact
mandatory listing criteria for it, and
amend CESA to require FGC to rely
solely upon the scientific information
produced by DFG and/or the petitioner
in support of listing.
Additionally, the legislature should
waste no time in enacting a strong rule
outlawing ex parte contacts by or with
FGC commissioners during the pendency of any rulemaking proceeding,
including proceedings to list species.
Off-the-record contacts during an ongoing proceeding, to which no one has an
opportunity to respond, completely
defeat the purpose of the Administrative
Procedure Act and the Bagley-Keene
Open Meetings Act-both of which are
fully applicable to FGC. An ex parte
prohibition during a listing proceeding
is particularly appropriate, because it is
quasijudicial in nature; it focuses on the
eligibility of a single species for listing.
Also, in light of the commissioners'
apparent unfamiliarity with state conflict-of-interest prohibitions, the
Resources Agency (in conjunction with
the Fair Political Practices Commission)
should sponsor a detailed ethics training
program for all members of its constituent boards and commissions.
Rather than curing the symptoms of
the problem, however, the legislature
should tackle the disease: the structural
flaws which prevent FGC and DFG
from fulfilling their statutory mandates.
As noted by the Little Hoover
Commission, FGC's focus is simply outdated; its hunters-only membership and
apparent bias are simply inconsistent
with the majority of environmentallyenlightened Californians. Just as the legislature recently abolished the California
Waste Management Board for its failure
to tackle this state's serious solid waste
crisis with modem-day solutions such as
recycling and source reduction,'54 the
legislature must reestablish its intent
with regard to the priorities of DFG and
FGC, to eliminate the traditional "structured-taking" purpose of the agencies
and infuse them with priorities of
preservation and enhancement.
However, the approaches taken in SB
2840, ACA 51, and the Costa package
are seriously flawed. SB 2840 and ACA
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51 suffer from the Sacramento-style
assumption that government operates
properly through "governance by vector." That is, an agency should represent
the profit-stake interests (the "players")
concerned about its decisions. State policy therefore is the end result of the
preferences of these actors, each vectoring their influence into a final mix.
However, the very notion of government in many contexts is the recognition
of the structural impossibility of private
interests combining to act in the public
interest. Indeed, the existence of most
regulatory agencies is purportedly justified by the need for a public substitute
or countervailing adjustment. It is ironic
to create an agency to protect the public
from profit-stake interests, and then turn
that agency over to those very interests
or to their surrogates. In the area of protecting endangered species, the
Sacramento preoccupation with bringing
all "players" together to resolve public
policy issues is most self-defeating.
Here, the interest vindicated by FGC's
purpose is one of the most underrepresented in the state: the future, the gene
pool of the earth, the inarticulate plants
and animals in danger of extinction.
Both proposals for FGC reform simply take a list of those with profit-stake
interests, stir in several persons with an
academic or broader perspective, and
declare the stew equitable. However, the
purpose of FGC purportedly is to represent the state's interest in advancing a
human ethic representing our highest
aspiration: leaving the earth to our legatees without the loss of plants and animals which will never again appear but
for our protective intervention. Each and
every person governing that agency
should be true to its mission and concerned primarily with the accomplishment of its purpose, not with collateral
or contrary agendas.
While well-intentioned, these
"reform" bills ignore the fact that the
Department of Fish and Game was not
created to safeguard the interests of
hunters, or commercial fishers, or animal protectionists, or land trust organizations. These special interests are perfectly capable of making their views
known to the regulatory agency and to
the legislature. Vesting them with the
actual decisionmaking authority as the
"state" is a form of political immorality.
Any entity permitted to establish state
policy should consist solely of public
members who are untainted by any
pecuniary, personal, or profit-stake
interest in the decisions made.
Worse still, the Costa bills would
wipe out FGC-the only forum before
which the public may express its views
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and petition for redress of its
grievances regarding the preservation of
California's flora and fauna. As weak,
biased, and inadequate as the current
FGC may be, it is at least required to
meet in public, make its decisions in
public, and listen to the public.
Transferring FGC's authority to DFG,
no matter what its name may become
and regardless of its new priorities, would
enable a single director to make all policy decisions behind closed doors-free
from public debate or meaningful input.
The Fish and Game Commission was
created in the California Constitution,
and should not be denigrated into
an advisory board. The existence of
FGC is the structural saving grace of
DFG; without FGC, DFG is like
the Department of Insurance, the
Department of Corporations, and the
Department of Banking-all of which
are regrettably run by a single political
appointee who is not required to hold
open meetings at which the public may
meaningfully debate or contribute to
proposed policies. The answer here is
not to abolish FGC but to strengthen it,
make it independent of the Department
and of all the constituencies which
would control it, and give it the charter,
authority, and resources it must have in
order to accomplish its mission.
If we are serious about our obligations to the generations to follow us-an
obligation which one might argue goes
to the heart of the human ethical imperative-then our system of protection
must identify those species in danger of
extinction- far enough in advance to
ameliorate the cost of preservation, and
to make it practically possible. And it
must have the authority to protect. To be
sure, that protection may involve an element of taking. Where that element of
taking occurs without adequate advance
warning, the general public should be
prepared to pay compensation, and
should not impose extreme costs on a
few private interests for a benefit conferred on all of us and our progeny. We
should be prepared to pay that price. If
we want to change private forces to protect that which is in jeopardy, it may
hurt all of us a little to do it. But given
the material wealth we have created,
particularly in one of the wealthiest
political jurisdictions in the world, we
have no excuses to offer those who will
judge our performance in the decades to
come. We have no excuses at all.
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approved for publication by FGC at its
May 1990 meeting.
3. Id.
4. Id. at 2.
5. But see infra text accompanying
notes 119-29.
6. Fish and Game Code § 2051.
7. CESA focuses on protection of
listed species from state-sponsored
activities; it does not directly protect
state-listed species from harm caused by
the federal government, local governments, or private action. Although
CESA encourages private landowners to
"cooperate" in the state's goal of species
conservation and protection, Fish and
Game Code § 2056, and prohibits individuals from taking listed species, id. at
§ 2080, its thrust is primarily aimed at
protecting listed native species from
adverse impact caused by the state.
However, listing of a species by FGC
pursuant to CESA indirectly protects the
species from harm caused by local governments and private interests, under
the provisions of the California
Environmental Quality Act (CEQA),
Public Resources Code § 21000 et seq.
CEQA, which is applicable to governmental agencies at all levels and private
projects which require government permits, leases, or other entitlements, effectively forces agencies to seek feasible
means to reduce or avoid significant
environmental damage that otherwise
could result from their actions. Id. at §
21002. Whenever a proposed "project"
may cause a "significant effect" on the
environment, public agencies (both project proponents and those approving private projects) must prepare an environmental impact report (EIR). Id. at §§
21002.1, 21082.2. Adverse impact on a
state-listed species must be addressed in
the EIR for any "project" under CEQA,
which is broadly defined as "the whole
of an action, which has the potential for
resulting in a physical change in the
environment .... 14 California Code
of Regulations (CCR) § 15378(a)
(Resources Agency's Guidelines for
Implementation of the California
Environmental Quality Act). Thus, state
listing has serious consequences for all
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actors wishing to engage in numerous
types of land use and development.
Although the vast body of CEQA
law provides an important backdrop for
any discussion of environmental protection, this article is intended to illuminate
CESA and does not address CEQA in
depth. For an excellent and exhaustive
treatment of CEQA, see Remy, Thomas,
et al., Guide to the California
Environmental Quality Act (1989
Edition).
Further, this article does not discuss
the federal Endangered Species Act of
1983, 16 U.S.C. § 1531 et seq., upon
which CESA was based.
8. Fish and Game Code §§ 20702079.
9. Id. at § 2062.
10. Jd. at § 2067.
11. Id. at § 2070.
12. ld. at § 2072.7. Most petitions to
list species are initiated by the
Department.
13. ld. at § 2072.3.
14. Id. Other factors which must be
addressed in the petition include the
impact of existing management efforts;
suggestions for future management;
information regarding the kind of habitat necessary for species survival; a
detailed distribution map; and any other
information the petitioner deems relevant. Id.
15. See supra note 7.
16. Fish and Game Code § 2072.7.
17. Id. at § 2073.5. DFG is not
required to engage in any investigation
of its own; its evaluation of the requested listing is based solely on the information presented by petitioner in the petition. See id. at § 2074.8 ("[n]othing in
this article imposes any duty or obligation for, or otherwise requires, the commission or the department to undertake
studies or other assessments of any
species when reviewing a petition and
its attendant documents and comments").
18. Id. at § 2074.
19. Section 2068 of the Fish and
Game Code defines a "candidate"
species as "a native species or subspecies of a bird, mammal, fish,
amphibian, reptile, or plant that the
commission has formally noticed as
being under review by the department
for addition to either the list of endangered species or the list of threatened
species, or a species for which the commission has published a notice of proposed regulation to add the species to
either list."
If DFG finds that there is insufficient
information in the petition to indicate
that the petitioned action may be warranted, this finding is theoretically sub-

ject to a petition for writ of mandate
under section 1094.5 of the Code of
Civil Procedure. Fish and Game Code §
2076.
20. In fact, "candidate" species are
subject only to the taking prohibition of
Fish and Game Code section 2080 (if
FGC issues a specified notice, pursuant
to section 2085). They are not entitled to
any of the other protections afforded
listed species under Articles 3 and 4 of
CESA; see infra Section II(B) for information on these protections.
21. Fish and Game Code § 2074.6.
22. Id. at § 2075.
23. Id. at § 2071.5. FGC's "criteria"
implementing CESA are codified at 14
CCR § 670.1 (b); see infra text accompanying note 66 and n.66.
24. The regulations promulgated by
FGC under CESA appear in section
670.1-670.5, Title 14 of the CCR.
25. Fish and Game Code § 2075.5(2).
In other words, if FGC decides-after
its ten-day review period, DFG's ninetyday preliminary review period, and
DFG's subsequent one-year formal
review period-that the proposed listing
is warranted, it must then formally adopt
an amendment to section 670.2 or 670.5,
Title 14 of the CCR, to officially add the
species to the appropriate list. Formal
rulemaking procedures and provisions
for OAL review-which themselves
often consume at least six months to one
year-are codified in the Administrative
Procedure Act, Government Code §
11340 et seq.
26. Fish and Game Code § 2076.
27. Id. at § 2076.5. This provision
and section 240 of the Fish and Game
Code authorize FGC to engage in emergency rulemaking under section 11346.1
of the Government Code. Any emergency listing adopted pursuant to these sections is effective for 120 days,
Government Code § 11346.1(e), during
which time the Commission must initiate formal rulemaking proceedings pursuant to Government Code section
11340 et seq. See supra note 25 and
accompanying text.
28. Emergency listing of a species
carries with it all the protections afforded to species listed through the normal
rulemaking process. But see infra text
accompanying note 62.
29. Fish and Game Code § 2077.
30. Id. at § 2077(e).
31. Id.
32. Id. at § 2079.
33. Id. at § 2080. Under section
2081, DFG may enter into memoranda
of understanding or grant permits to
"authorize individuals, public agencies,
universities, zoological gardens, and scientific or educational institutions" to
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take listed species "for scientific, educational, or management purposes."
The section 2081 "management take"
exception to the taking prohibition is
becoming the object of concern to some
environmentalists. In an April 20, 1990
letter to Richard Spotts, the California
representative of Defenders of Wildlife,
DFG Director Pete Bontadelli stated that
the Department has recently been
"developing the use of Section 2081 in
situations where enhancement and conservation of a species occur as part of a
management action that also involves
some take." In other words, DFG has
granted "management take" permits to
developers in exchange for their agreement to "acquire sufficient off-site mitigation land to replace or enhance the
impacted species population or, alternatively, must turn to third parties such as
The Nature Conservancy to undertake
certain management duties as the project
developer's agent." According to
Bontadelli, "in the few cases where we
have implemented it to date, the application of Section 2081 has allowed us to
guarantee better protection and conservation for the endangered species in
question than we have historically been
able to provide."
One disturbing aspect of DFG's
implementation of section 2081 is that it
is being done without the benefit of
legally-required regulations which set
forth specific criteria under which
developers may be adjudged eligible for
"management take" permits, and the
enhancement/preservation/mitigation
measures for which they must be
responsible. In other words, DFG's failure to promulgate regulations under the
Administrative Procedure Act "to implement, interpret, or make specific the law
enforced or administered by it [section
2081], or to govern its procedure"
(Government Code § 11342(b) (emphasis added)) is arguably "underground
rulemaking."
34. Once FGC has designated a
species as a "candidate" under section
2074.2(a)(2), DFG must make reasonable attempts "to notify affected and
interested parties and to solicit data and
comments on the petitioned action from
as many persons as practicable." Fish
and Game Code § 2074.4. Once this
notice has been issued, candidate
species are subject to the section 2080
taking prohibition pursuant to section
2085.
35. Id. at § 2090(b).
36. "Lead agency" and "project" are
terms of art borrowed from CEQA,
Public Resources Code § 21000 et seq.
See Fish and Game Code §§ 2064-65.
37. See 14 CCR § 750 et seq.
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38. Fish and Game Code § 2090(a).
39. Id. at § 2090(b). DFG's written
finding and determination must be based
upon "the best available scientific information." Id.
40. Id. at § 2092(c).
41. Id. at § 2091.
42. Id. at § 2092(a).
43. Id. at § 2092(b). This exception
does not apply to projects which would
likely result in the extinction of any
endangered or threatened species. See
id. at § 2092(b), 2092(c).
44. Id. at § 2092(b). This last requirement effectively asks the state lead
agency to make a finding that it has
acted in bad faith by expending significant resources on the project after commencement of the consultation process,
in order to be able to argue that a change
in plans would constitute a significant
waste of money. The likelihood that any
lead agency would make such a finding
is nil.
45. Fish and Game Code § 2097 sets
forth the duration of the Article 4 consultation requirements. As originally
enacted in 1984, Article 4 was to sunset
on July 1, 1990. In 1989, the legislature
extended Article 4's duration until
January 1, 1994 (Chapter 423, Statutes
of 1989).
46. 1989 Annual Report, supra note
2, at4.
47. Id. Further, several informal,
informational meetings took place
regarding projects affecting listed
species. These meetings allowed the
Department to resolve potential problems before formal consultations
became necessary. Telephone Interview
with Paul Kelly, California Endangered
Species Act Coordinator, DFG's Natural
Heritage Division (Apr. 6, 1990); see
also 1989 Annual Report, supra note 2,
at 4.
48. Fish and Game Code § 2052.
49. Department of Fish and Game,
1988 Annual Report on the Status of
California'sListed Threatened and
Endangered Plants and Animals (March
1989) at 22 (hereinafter "1988 Annual
Report").
50. See California Nature Conservancy, Sliding Toward Extinction: The
State of California's Natural Heritage
(November 1987) at 33-34 (hereinafter referred to as "Sliding Toward
Extinction").
51. 1989 Annual Report, supra note
2, at ii.
52. See California Regulatory Law
Reporter (hereinafter "CRLR") Vol. 9,
No. 3 (Summer 1989) at 109; Vol. 7,
No. 4 (Fall 1987) at 94; Vol. 7, No. 3
(Summer 1987) at 119; and Vol. 6, No. 4
(Fall 1986) at 78-79.
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53. 1989 Annual Report, supra note
2, at ii.
54. Bowman, Open Season on
Wildlife Panel, Sacramento Bee, Dec.
31, 1989, at Al, AI8. A recent example
of this dangerous predilection was the
long-awaited listing of the Sacramento
River winter-run king salmon. After
several years of rejecting petitions to list
the fish, whose population once numbered 60,000-120,000 in the 1960s,
FGC decided on April 27, 1989, to
reconsider the matter after being presented with evidence that only 2,085 of
the fish remained. By its very next meeting (May 16, 1989), FGC was informed
that only 600 salmon then remained, and
finally decided to list the fish as endangered. See CRLR Vol. 9, No. 3
(Summer 1989) at 108; and Vol. 7, No. 4
(Fall 1987) at 94.
55. 1989 Annual Report, supra note
2, at ii (emphasis added).
56. Id.
57.Id. at 11.
58. Id. See also Sliding Toward
Extinction, supra note 50, at 15-16.
59. Fellmeth, A Theory of Regulation: A Platform for State Regulatory
Reform, CRLR Vol. 5, No. 2 (Spring
1985) 1, 10-15.
60. This computation allows FGC ten
days to preliminarily evaluate the petition and turn it over to DFG; DFG ninety days to evaluate the petition and
make a recommendation to FGC; FGC
thirty days in which to hold a meeting
and approve "candidate" status; 365
days for DFG to fully evaluate the petition; another thirty days until FGC's
next meeting, at which the "final consideration" vote is taken; fourteen days for
FGC staff to prepare and file the notice
of proposed rulemaking; 45 days for a
public comment period and a public
hearing; 30 days for FGC's preparation
of the rulemaking file for submission to
the Office of Administrative Law; and
30 days for OAL review and approval.
FGC has not always been prompt in its
decisionmaking on petitions for listing;
see, e.g., discussion of desert tortoise,
infra at text accompanying notes
130-42.
61. The performance of OAL, as
adjudged by regulatory agencies themselves, has been extensively critiqued in
this publication. See CRLR Vol. 8, No.
4 (Fall 1988) at 8; see also Vol. 5, No. 1
(Winter 1985) at 3; Vol. 3, No. 2 (Spring
1984) at 14; Vol. 3, No. 1 (Winter 1983)
at 13; and Vol. 1, No. 1 (Spring 1981)
at 2.
62. Telephone interview with Paul
Kelly, California Endangered Species
Act Coordinator, DFG's Natural
Heritage Division (May 2, 1990).

63. Fish and Game Code §§ 2074.4,
2090.
64. Id. at § 2071.5.
65. 14 CCR § 670.1(b).
66. Compare Fish and Game Code §
2062 (see supra text at note 9) with 14
CCR § 670.1(b) (see supra text at note

65).
67. Sacramento Bee, Dec. 31, 1989,
A18, col. 1.
68. Code of Civil Procedure §
1094.5(c); see also Fellmeth and
Folsom, California Regulatory Law
and Practice at 126 (1981).
69. Code of Civil Procedure §
1094.5(c).
70. But see supranote 7.
71. As noted above, even a state lead
agency is permitted to approve projects
where jeopardy to a listed species is
found, if it requires mitigation and
enhancement measures which will "minimize the adverse impacts of the project" upon the listed species; and it finds
that the proposed project is more beneficial than the project as compromised by
alternatives suggested by DFG, and that
it has not made an irretrievable commitment of resources to the project after
DFG consultation has commenced. Fish
and Game Code § 2092.
72. Telephone interview with
Richard Spotts, California representative
of Defenders of Wildlife (Oct. 11,
1989).
73. The Fourth District Court of
Appeal currently has before it an appeal
of the decision in City of El Cajon v.
State of California, No. EC-002333, in
which the City unsuccessfully attempted
to halt aerial malathion spraying by the
California Department of Food and
Agriculture (CDFA). One of the causes
of action alleged by the City is CDFA's
failure to comply with CESA's consultation requirement. See infra text accompanying notes 119-29.
74. See supra note 73.
75. Fish and Game Code § 2090.
76. See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
77. Telephone interview with Paul
Kelly, California Endangered Species
Act Coordinator, DFG's Natural
Heritage Division (Apr. 6, 1990).
78. Government Code § 87100.
79. Sacramento Bee, Dec. 31, 1989,
A18, columns 2, 3. A bill currently
pending in the legislature, ACA 51
(Campbell) would buttress Government
Code § 87100 by expressly prohibiting
any FGC commissioner from participating in any decision in which the member
has a personal financial interest.
80. Commission on California State
Government
Organization
and
Economy, Report on California'sFish
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and Game Commission and Department
of Fish and Game (January 1990) (hereinafter referred to as "LHC Report").
For a comprehensive summary of this
report, see CRLR Vol. 10, No. 1
(Winter 1990) at 38-41.
81. Fish and Game Code §§ 400-700.
82. California Department of Fish
and Game, A Message From the
Director-Preserving Wildlife for
Everyone (Dec. 1979).
83. Fish and Game Code § 701.
84. California Constitution, Article
IV, § 20.
85. Fish and Game Code § 206.
86. Government Code § 11120 et seq.
87. Id. at § 11340 et seq.
88. LHC Report, supra note 80, at 5.
89. Fish and Game Code § 200 et seq.
90. Public Resources Code § 21000.
91. Id. at § 21001.
92. 14 CCR § 15386 (Resources
Agency's Guidelines for Implementation of the California Environmental Quality Act). In its role as a
trustee agency under CEQA, DFG's
Environmental Services Division
reviews thousands of CEQA-required
environmental impact reports annually.
1989 Annual Report, supra note 2, at 4.
93. LHC Report, supra note 80, at 2.
To resolve this problem, the Commission recommended that a special
Resources Agency task force be convened to develop criteria for FGC membership, and suggested that FGC include
a balance of biologists, environmentalists, developers, ranchers, and sportspersons.
94. Id. at 20-21. The Hoover report
suggested the formation of a special
Resources Agency Oversight Task
Force, composed of one executive member from each of the major resourcerelated Resources Agency commissions
and departments. This Task Force would
attempt to unify policy and practice with
respect to all significant aspects of
California's fish and game, water, and
habitat-related issues.
95. Id. at 29.
96. Id. at 21-23. As examples of
FGC's poor performance in this area,
the Little Hoover Commission pointed
specifically to FGC's ill-informed decisions to approve hunting seasons for the
mountain lion and the black bear, and its
long-overdue decision to list the winterrun king salmon as endangered. Id.; see
also CRLR Vol. 10, No. 1 (Winter
1990) at 138-39; Vol. 9, No. 4 (Fall
1989) at 119; and Vol. 9, No. 3 (Summer
1989) at I11.
Rather than recommending abolition
of FGC, the Little Hoover Commission
suggested that the proposed Resources
Agency Oversight Task Force, see supra

note 94, the legislature, and the
Governor's office carefully assess
FGC's performance in monitoring DFG,
responding to public input, and making
full use of scientific analyses prior to
deciding issues before it.
97. LHC Report, supra note 80, at 5.
98. Id. at 7. These figures do not
include money provided to DFG
through Proposition 70, the California
Wildlife, Coastal and Parkland
Conservation Bond Act, which was
passed by the electorate at the June 1988
election. The initiative allocates $131
million per year for specified environmental programs, some of which are
administered by DFG. They also do not
include monies generated from
Proposition 99, the tobacco tax increase
initiative approved by the electorate in
November 1988. Proposition 99 was
expected to generate over $42 million
for various resources programs in 198990, 50% of which was allocated to
wildlife habitat programs. Office of the
Legislative Analyst, The 1990-91
Budget.: Perspectives and Issues (Feb.
1990) at 312, 315.
99. Office of the Legislative Analyst,
Analysis of the 1990-91 Budget Bill
(Feb. 21, 1990) at 378. In 1990-91,
DFG's Natural Heritage Division, one of
whose functions is to implement CESA,
would receive approximately $5 million
from the Environmental License Plate
Fund, $1.56 million from the Fish and
Game Preservation Fund, $733,000
from the federal government, $1.2 million from Proposition 99 monies,
$331,000 from the state's general fund,
and $101,000 in reimbursements.
Telephone interview with Gary Fujii,
DFG Associate Budget Analyst (May
17, 1990).
100. See infra text accompanying
notes 110-16.
101. LHC Report, supra note 80, at
25. Despite this low level of funding in
relation to the scope of the job and the
size of the state, DFG points out that
"California spends five times more on
nongame and endangered species than
the next closest state and commits a
greater portion of its total budget to
these resources than all other states
except one." 1989 Annual Report, supra
note 2, at 12.
102. LHC Report, supra note 80, at 25.
103. Fish and Game Code § 7 11 (a).
104. Testimony of Richard Spotts,
California Representative for the
Defenders of Wildlife, to the Little
Hoover Commission(June 27, 1989) at 7.
105. VanVleck, The Report of the
Resources Agency Task Force on the
Budget and Fiscal Procedures of the
Department of Fish and Game (Aug. 15,
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1989) at 8. The special task force was
established in April 1989 to respond to
harsh legislative criticism of DFG's
financial management and budget development processes. See id. at 5.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 23.
108. Office of the Legislative
Analyst, Analysis of the 1990-91 Budget
Bill (Feb. 21, 1990) at 322. In its report,
the Little Hoover Commission noted
that "the Department has been nearly
wholly unable to satisfy Legislative
informational requests." However, LHC
also acknowledged:
As noted by the Task Force
report and the DFG's most
vocal critics, the Department's
fiscal accounting environment
is not a happy one. There exist
21 "categorical" or dedicated
accounts against which the
DFG must charge portions of
many employees' time, and for
which there must be separate
accounting. By consensus opinion, this represents one of the
State's most complex bookkeeping systems.
LHC Report, supra note 80, at 32.
In its analysis of the 1990-91 budget,
the Legislative Analyst noted that DFG,
under orders from the legislature to provide budget, fiscal, and accounting
training to key staff, "has made a concerted effort to provide training to staff,
to document its proposals more fully,
and to respond to the various recommendations made by the Resources
Agency Task Force." However, despite
this apparent progress, the Analyst notes
that DFG's expenditure plan for 198990 and proposed budget for 1990-91
would "put the Fish and Game
Preservation Fund in the red" to the tune
of $9.5 million for those fiscal years.
109. LHC Report, supra note 80, at
33. The Little Hoover Commission
urged the Resources Agency to press for
more resources for DFG, "with special
emphasis on adequate provision of
services to the Department's Environmental Services Division." Id. at 37.
110. 1989 Annual Report, supra note
2, at 1. The "rare" designation is accorded only to plants, pursuant to CESA's
predecessor statute, the Native Plant
Protection Act.
111. Id. at 2. See also California
Nature Conservancy, California
Extinction Index (1989).
112. Telephone interview with Paul
Kelly, California Endangered Species
Act Coordinator, DFG's Natural
Heritage Division (Apr. 6, 1990).
113. 1988 Annual Report, supra note
49, at 3.
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114. The four animal species listed in
1989 are the desert tortoise, the bank
swallow, the winter-run chinook salmon,
and the Tipton kangaroo rat. 1989
Annual Report, supra note 2, at ii. DFG
had recommended the listing of all 25
petitioned plants, but FGC rejected
three. Id.
115. See supra text accompanying
note 79.
116. 1989 Annual Report, supra note
2, at 7.
117. Telephone interview with Ron
Pelzman, FGC Regulations Coordinator
(Oct. 12, 1989).
118. Sliding Toward Extinction,
supra note 50, at 80.
119. 14 CCR § 15386 (Resources
Agency's Guidelines for Implementation of the California Environmental
Quality Act).
120. See infra agency report on
CDFA in this issue of CRLR; see also
CRLR Vol. 10, No. 1 (Winter 1990) at
118-19.
121. City of El Cajon v. State of
California, No. EC-002333 (petition
filed May 18, 1990). El Cajon also
charged that CDFA failed to provide an
adequate written decision as required by
Food and Agricultural Code § 5051 et
seq.; that aerial malathion spraying is an
actionable nuisance within the meaning
of Civil Code § 3479 et seq.; and that
CDFA violated CEQA due to its failure
to establish that the Mexfly infestation
is an "emergency" as defined in Public
Resources Code § 21060.3.
122. Telephone interview with Kent
Smith (DFG Sacramento) (May 14 and
May 21, 1990) ("as far as we can tell,
there has not been a formal or informal
consultation. There was not a formal
consult. There may have been an informal discussion, but there was no followup [by CDFA] as far as I know"); telephone interview with John Gustafson,
DFG's biologist in charge of the Least
Bell's Vireo (DFG Sacramento) (May
14, 1990); telephone interview with
Jack Spruill (DFG Long Beach) (May
14, 1990); telephone interview with
Mike Giusti and Krishan Lal (DFG
Long Beach) (May 21, 1990).
123. Telephone interview with Mike
Giusti and Krishan Lal (DFG Long
Beach) (May 21, 1990).
124. Id.
125. Telephone interview with Paul
Kelly, California Endangered Species
Act Coordinator, DFG's Natural
Heritage Division (May 16, 1990).
126. Telephone interview with Kent
Smith (DFG Sacramento) (May 14,
1990); telephone interview with John
Gustafson, DFG's biologist in charge of
the Least Bell's Vireo (DFG Sacramento)
(May 16, 1990).
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127. City of El Cajon v. State of
California, No. EC-002333 (Memorandum of Decision) (June 4, 1990).
128. On June 4, 1990 (the same day
the decision was issued), the City filed a
notice of appeal and a motion for stay
pending appeal, in an attempt to stop
aerial spraying scheduled for that same
evening. The motion for stay pending
appeal was denied in a 2-1, one-sentence decision by the Fourth District
Court of Appeal. At this writing, El
Cajon's appeal of the lower court decision is still pending.
129. Fish and Game Code § 2090. In
the El Cajon case, CDFA produced no
written finding by DFG pursuant to this
section.
130. Testimony of Richard Spotts,
California Representative for Defenders
of Wildlife, to the Little Hoover
Commission (June 27, 1989) at 6. Mr.
Spotts also noted, "This is not only
because the Deukmejian Administration
gives the benefit of any doubt to commercial interests, but also because commercial interests give considerably more
campaign donations than conservationists." Id.
131. See CRLR Vol. 9, No. 4 (Fall
1989) at 117-18; Vol. 9, No. 3 (Summer
1989) at 108; Vol. 9, No. 2 (Spring
1989) at 102- 03; and Vol. 9, No. 1
(Winter 1989) at 91.
132. Los Angeles Times, Jun. 23,
1989, at 1-3; see also CRLR Vol. 9, No.
4 (Fall 1989) at 117-18.
133. Los Angeles Times, Feb. 19,
1989, at V-4, Col. 6; Los Angeles
Times, Jan. 26, 1988, at 1-3, col. 2.
134. Id.
135. Telephone interview with
Robert Treanor, FGC Assistant Executive Secretary (May 8, 1990); see also
Assembly Committee on Water, Parks
and Wildlife, Committee Analysis of SB
999 (McCorquodale) (May 30, 1989).
136. 14 CCR § 670.5.
137. Los Angeles Times, Feb. 3,
1989, at 1-29, col. 1.
138. Los Angeles Times, Jan. 26,
1988, at 1-3, col. 2.
139. Los Angeles Times, Feb. 3,
1989, at 1-29, col. 1; telephone interview
with Kristin Berry (Mar. 2, 1989).
140. CRLR Vol. 9, No. 2 (Spring
1989) at 102-03. When tortoise proponents returned at FGC's April 1989
meeting and urged it to reconsider its
delay decision and list the tortoise
immediately, FGC again refused. CRLR
Vol. 9, No. 3 (Summer 1989) at 108.
141. See, e.g., Testimony of Richard
Spotts, California Representative for the
Defenders of Wildlife, to the Little
Hoover Commission (June 27, 1989) at
5-6 ("...the FGC is increasingly seen as

an impediment to wildlife conservation.
In other words, they have become part
of the problem rather than the solution....The FGC seems to spend inordinate time on relatively mundane matters,
alienates many of its potential constituencies, exhibits management
philosophies shared by a shrinking
minority of Californians, and is nearly
invisible at the State Capitol on crucial
legislative and budget issues") (emphasis original).
142. Shortly after FGC listed the
desert tortoise, three environmental
groups (Natural Resources Defense
Council, Environmental Defense Fund,
and Defenders of Wildlife) sued the U.S.
Department of the Interior to compel it
to list the tortoise as endangered under
the federal act. On July 24, 1989-six
days after the lawsuit was filed, Interior
Secretary Manuel Lujan agreed to adopt
an emergency regulation listing the
western Mojave desert tortoise population as endangered.
143. SB 999 was subsequently
amended to delete the provision precluding OAL review.
144. Assembly Committee on Water,
Parks and Wildlife, Committee Analysis
of SB 999 (McCorquodale) (May 30,
1989).
145. Telephone interview with
Richard Spotts, California representative
for Defenders of Wildlife (Oct. 11,
1989).
146. Governor's Veto Message on
SB 999 (McCorquodale) (Sept. 26,
1989).
147. CaliforniaRegulatory Notice
Register (Feb. 17, 1989) at 308; see also
CRLR Vol. 9, No. 3 (Summer 1989) at
108. As noted, FGC listing is already
wholly discretionary. Neither CESA nor
the regulations adopted by FGC to
implement CESA meaningfully mandate
FGC to list a species under any circumstances. See supra text accompanying
notes 63-69.
148. California Regulatory Notice
Register (May 5, 1989) at 1246; id.
(May 12, 1989) at 1355.
Recovery plans have recently been
the subject of controversy at FGC meetings. To the extent CESA addresses
recovery plans, it requires DFG to suggest "management activities and other
recommendations for recovery of the
[listed] species." Fish and Game Code §
2077(a). Thus, FGC's originally proposed rulemaking to require DFG to
prepare recovery plans for listed species
would appear to be superfluous.
However, FGC Commissioner Albert
Taucher recently attempted to require
petitioners to prepare and present recov-
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ery plans as a condition precedent to the
Commission's consideration of their
petitions for listing. Commissioner
Everett McCracken questioned FGC's
authority to impose such a requirement;
Commission Executive Secretary Harold
Cribbs opined that a recovery plan
requirement is not authorized. See
CRLRVol. 10, No.1 (Winter 1990) at 139.
149. See CRLR Vol. 9, No. 4 (Fall
1989) at 118.
150. Fish and Game Code § 3005.7
(repealed by its own terms January 1,
1986). Several legislative attempts to
extend the statute, including SB 76
(Presley) and AB 476 (Bates), failed.
See CRLR Vol. 7, No. 2 (Spring 1987)
at 92-94.
151. In 1987, FGC approved the first
mountain lion hunt in sixteen years.
Neither that hunt nor a similar hunt
approved by the Commission in 1988
have ever occurred. Both were declared
unlawful by San Francisco Superior
Court Judge Lucy Kelly McCabe, on
grounds that DFG's environmental
impact reports required under CEQA
were legally insufficient. These rulings
were recently upheld by the First
District Court of Appeal, which called
DFG's EIRs "woefully inadequate,"
Mountain Lion Coalition v. California
Fish and Game Commission, et al., 214
Cal. App. 3d 1043 (1st Dist., Oct. 17,
1989); see CRLR Vol. 10, No. 1
(Winter 1990) at 138-39 for complete
summary of this case.
152. Telephone interview of Paul
Kelly, California Endangered Species
Act Coordinator, DFG's Natural
Heritage Division (Apr. 6, 1990). At
least two courts would question the sufficiency and validity of DFG's data on
the mountain lion population. See
Mountain Lion Coalition v. California
Fish and Game Commission, supra note
151.
153. Telephone interview with
Sharon Negri, representative of the
Mountain Lion Preservation Foundation
(Oct. 11, 1989).
154. In its enactment of AB 939
(Sher) (Chapter 1095, Statutes of 1989),
the legislature recently demonstrated its
willingness to abolish a board with a
biased membership and an outdated
focus. AB 939 abolished the California
Waste Management Board (CWMB),
which-like FGC-was composed of
five part-time commissioners appointed
by the Governor. Because its enabling
statute contained no criteria for membership on the board, CWMB became
dominated by members of the trash
hauling industry; thus, in its formulation
of state policy regarding solid waste
management, the Board naturally
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favored landfill creation and expansion,
and virtually ignored recycling, source
reduction, and waste-to-energy technology.
AB 939 wiped out CWMB and
replaced it with the California Integrated
Waste Management and Recycling
Board, to be composed of six full-time
members variously appointed by the
Governor, Senate, and Assembly. The
legislature also instilled the new board
with a mandated focus on recycling,
source reduction, waste-to-energy technology, and other methods of resolving
the state's solid waste crisis long
ignored by CWMB. See CRLR Vol. 10,
No. 1 (Winter 1990) at 129-30; and Vol.
9, No. 4 (Fall 1989) at 110-11 for further
information on AB 939 (Sher).
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